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RELATIONAL CREATIVITY AND THE SYMMETRY
OF FREEDOM AND NATURE
Philip Rose
ABSTRACT: One of the more important and persistent of problems in speculative philosophy is
reconciling the relation between freedom and nature. This is often referred to as the problem
of freedom and determinism, but this way of formulating the problem assumes, uncritically,
that nature is and must necessarily be a purely deterministic framework. As I hope to show, the
so-called problem of freedom and determinism lies precisely in this deterministic assumption.
By reorienting the question in terms of the relation between freedom and nature, rather than
freedom  and  determinism,  we  can  better  see  how  the  problem  of  their  tension  or
‘contradiction’ only arises if nature itself is defined and characterized in a very limited, purely
deterministic way. Once we step outside the deterministic assumption and entertain alternative
views of nature, the problem of freedom and determinism does not arise.
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INTRODUCTION
Speculative Philosophy is constantly faced with the problem of reconciling elements
of  experience  that  appear to  stand  in  a  problematic,  perhaps  even  contradictory
relation to each another. One of the more important and persistent of these problems is
the relation between freedom and nature. Expressed in Kantian terms, the problem is
reconciling the unconditional,  creative character of freedom with the conditional,  determinate
character of the natural world. This is often referred to as the problem of freedom and
determinism, but this way of formulating the problem assumes, uncritically, that nature
is and must necessarily be a purely deterministic framework. As I hope to show, the so-
called problem of freedom and determinism lies precisely in this deterministic assumption,
an assumption which is so deep-seated and uncritically accepted that it is often treated
as if it were a self-evident truth. By reorienting the question in terms of the relation
between freedom and nature, rather than freedom and determinism, we can better see
how the problem of their tension or ‘contradiction’ only arises if nature itself is defined
and characterized in a very limited,  purely deterministic way. This was part of Kant’s
problem and it  remains  the  primary source of  the  many  debates  that  have  raged
around the relation between the ideas of freedom and nature. Once we step outside the
deterministic assumption and are willing to entertain alternative views of nature, the
problem of freedom and determinism does not arise.
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I begin by outlining the problem of freedom and nature expressed as a demand for
symmetry in the philosophy of nature. I follow with a discussion of creative freedom,
contrasting it with what I refer to as other conditional forms of freedom. I then give a
brief  history  of  the  idea  of  creative  freedom, with  particular  emphasis on  Kant’s
treatment of the problem of freedom and nature. Finally, drawing upon the work of
Whitehead, I outline my own response to the problem, outlining the basis for a new
philosophy of nature grounded in the metaphysics of relational creativity.
THE UNCONDITIONED AND CONDITIONED
The intelligibility of the natural world rests upon the belief/assumption that most or
all  of the conditions within nature stand in conditional relations to other known or
knowable conditions. Individual  instances within  nature  can then  be explained  by
reference to their conditional relations to other elements in the system. This is another
way of saying, following Kant, that everything in nature is conditioned. Difficulties arise
when  you  introduce  an  element  into  the  overall  scheme  that  is  by  definition
unconditioned, e.g., self-determination or self-origination in a strong, creative sense of those
terms. The principle of creative freedom is a prime example of something that appears to
be unconditioned in this sense. If creative freedom is unconditioned, then it would seem
that  instances  of  creative  freedom  cannot  be  explained  by  way  of  other  known
conditions. Following the deterministic assumption that all things in nature stand in a purely
determinate  (or  predetermining)  relation  to  other  conditions,  talk  about  creative
freedom seems to introduce an irrational element into the world that defies explanation
(in terms of the conditional framework of nature as a whole). Not only that, but because
it is unconditioned, creative freedom is often said to be unintelligible (e.g., Mackie 1955;
Dennett 1990). For when we ask where it comes from, where it stands in relation to
other things, or what its ground is, we are often left with claims and questions that have
a certain air of paradox about them (analogous to the question of where God came
from  or  what  caused  God,  etc.).  The  difficulty  for  speculative  philosophy  lies  in
providing a systematic account of these apparently contradictory claims in a way that
affirms the integrity of both, preserving both the intelligibility of nature and a strong
sense of creative freedom.
SYMMETRY AND NATURE
Philosophy is often driven by deep seated principles and assumptions about the way
the world can or cannot be. These assumptions play a crucial role in shaping the nature
of the problems that philosophers address. One such assumption is what van Fraassen
critically refers to as the ‘symmetry instinct,’ or the “thirst for hidden variables”; i.e.,
the quest or drive to find intelligible patterns throughout experience. The conviction
underlying the ‘symmetry instinct’ is that “an asymmetry must always come from an
asymmetry”  (van Fraassen 1989,  239f).  That is,  any asymmetries in a system must
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themselves  be  conditioned  by  antecedent  asymmetries,  etc.  (as  a  variation  on  the
rationalist principle that something can’t come from nothing). Thus, there should be
nothing in the system as a whole that is not explicable in terms of the overall pattern of
the system.
Etymologically, the word ‘symmetry’ comes from the Greek  symmetria or of “the
same measure” (Hargittai 1994, p. XII, Preface). It is closely related to the idea of reason
understood as ratio or right proportion. The very possibility of a philosophy or science
of nature presupposes that symmetrical relations underlie various regions of possible
investigation, that is, that various elements within nature share “the same measure.”1
Applied  to  our  present  discussion,  the  problem of  freedom and nature  is  the
addition of an apparent asymmetry into the system of natural, conditional relations that
constitute  the  world.  The problem lies  in  bringing  the  unconditional character  of
creative freedom within the system of conditional relations that constitute nature in
general.  The radical  asymmetry  inherent  in  the idea of  creative freedom seems to
introduce a principle of spontaneity that generates a major inconsistency in the system
of purely deterministic natural relations.
UNCONDITIONED OR CREATIVE FREEDOM
Unconditioned  or  creative  freedom  is  a  kind  of  ‘metaphysical’  freedom.  It  is
importantly  distinct  from  the  ‘personal’  or  conditional freedoms  such  as  ‘political
freedom,’ ‘economic freedom,’ ‘freedom of speech,’ ‘freedom of conscience,’ ‘liberty,’
etc. Conditional freedom is the mere  freedom from constraints. Such constraints may be
internal or external, positive or negative depending on the context or the nature of the
examples employed, but in all cases the defining feature of such freedom is the extent to
which those constraining forces are present or absent.2 Thus the defining feature of
conditional freedom is the absence of constraints.3
Unlike personal  freedom,  creative freedom has little  to  do with  the  presence or
absence  of  constraints.  Creative  freedom  includes  the  various  principles  of  self-
origination,  self-determination,  self-construction,  or  self-integration.  It  is  often
1 The most common idea of symmetry is bilateral or reflective symmetry (as expressed in the ‘mirror image’
or the proposition A = A). A similar exactness is exhibited in geometric symmetry (the type of symmetry
usually associated with crystals) where there are well-defined limits that do not allow for the possibility of
degrees of symmetry.  Part of the cost of achieving this exactness, however, appears to be ‘the absence of
life.’ But not all  symmetries need be of this extremely exacting nature. The symmetry usually associated
with living things (such things as the structures of molecules or the pattern of veins running through a leaf) is
known as material symmetry. The shared measure underlying material symmetries allows for degrees of
difference between instances. The symmetry discussed here will be something akin to material symmetry
(for a more detailed discussion of the various kinds of symmetry, see Hargittai, 1994).
2 Examples of such constraints are provided by Feinberg (1973, Ch. 1). For instance a desire may be termed
a positive internal constraint, while a deficiency of ability may be a negative internal constraint, each in its
own way impeding the satisfaction of a genuine interest.
3 This does not mean that the mere presence of constraints implies a state of unfreedom. Someone who
claimed to be unfree because they could not change the time and place at which they were born would not
be unfree in the conditional sense of the term.
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associated  with  more  traditional  notions  such  as  ‘freedom  of  the  will,’  ‘spiritual
freedom,’ ‘existential freedom,’ or ‘creativity.’ In its most basic form creative freedom
affirms some positive  ‘power’/‘activity’  that directs and/or unifies  the conditions in
question. As an ‘unconditioned’ activity or power, creative freedom is never reducible
to  antecedent,  purely  deterministic  conditions.  Creative  freedom  thus  refers  to/is
defined as a metaphysical or transcendental ‘power’ or ‘activity.’ As a cause/ground of
action,  it  appears  to  be  identical  or  fully  coincident  with  (and  perhaps  even
indistinguishable from) an action or unified condition, making it appear (particularly
when viewed  from the  deterministic  assumption)  as  a  kind of  active  substance  or
efficacious spontaneity.4
THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND NATURE
Philosophical efforts to understand the general nature of things are often driven by
the instinct for symmetry (a ‘drive’ that is perhaps best understood as having a rational-
aesthetic  character).  As  already  noted,  however,  when  applying  this  instinct  for
symmetry we often proceed on the deterministic assumption that all relations in nature are
purely deterministic, that is, that all conditions found within nature can be reducible to
(e.g.,  are  caused  by)  other  known  or  knowable  external  or  antecedent,  efficient
conditions. Problems arise when we try to incorporate an account of creative freedom
into a purely deterministic philosophical system. For the moment we do so, we then
introduce  an  unconditional  (and  hence apparently  unintelligible)  element  into  the
otherwise conditional field of nature. The result is an asymmetry within nature that
violates our instinct for symmetry.  
The  difficulty  for  speculative  philosophy  lies  in  trying  to  provide  a  rational,
coherent account of this new, asymmetrical feature in terms that make sense within the
rational-aesthetic ideal of  the symmetry of the whole. This problem is of particular
importance to speculative philosophy (at least as it has been traditionally understood
and practised) insofar as its principal task to make sense of the ‘whole’ by offering a
systematic,  i.e., coherent, consistent, experientially adequate and applicable account of
the relations between the whole and its parts. To make philosophical sense of the whole
is to arrange the sum of its parts in a system of relations that possesses symmetry (one
that preserves the intelligibility of the parts and their various relations). The problem of
freedom and nature thus becomes the problem of marrying the unconditioned to the
conditioned, that is, of conditioning the unconditioned.
4 Many philosophers try to bring the general notion of metaphysical freedom into question by explaining it
away either as the product of a naturalistic need, a transcendental illusion, or some kind of confusion.
Despite the many suggested treatments that have been proposed to help ‘cure’ us of the problem of creative
freedom, however, it simply will not go away. The persistent efforts of those who would explain it away is
an acknowledgment of this fact. Thus the sheer persistence of the idea of creative freedom, as a problem
(particularly when viewed against the deterministic assumption) would seem to be reason enough to take it
seriously and to try to deal with it in a more positive manner than is sometimes fashionable.
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
The idea of creative freedom has a long history within the Western tradition (Rose
1997). We see it, for example, in Aristotle’s account of formal cause as a self-developing
or self-actualizing activity, and in his metaphysical account of the unmoved mover.5 We
can also clearly see it in Epicurus’ idea of the ‘swerve’ as a spontaneous turn away from
pre-determined  conditions.  But  we  see  it  expressed  most  dramatically  within  the
metaphysical theology of the medieval world. With the advent of the medieval period
and the powerful religious/moral belief in the idea of a creator God (i.e., a God who
created the world ex nihilo or out of nothing), the idea of creative freedom begins to take
centre stage in the history of philosophy (Gilson 1991, 64f). Of central concern during
this period is the development of a thorough understanding of humanity's relation to
God, a God who is creatively free in the most radical, metaphysical sense of the term.  
The overall symmetry of the medieval world view is maintained by referring all
things to God as their philosophical or intelligible ground. The creative freedom of
human beings (e.g., free will) is thereby explained as the mirror or created image of
God’s own creative power (which, as infinite and original, is said to be self-grounding,
i.e.,  possessing “its sole sufficient  reason”)  (Gilson 1991,  59f).  The medieval  system
begins to break down in the attempt to make the relation between God and the world
intelligible (e.g., the relation between human free will and God’s foreknowledge). We
can see this in the countless debates over freedom of the will  (in the face of God’s
omniscience), the character of God (e.g., whether God’s power is ordinato or providentio),
etc. In the end, the strong principle of asymmetry introduced by the idea of a creator
God, as a self-grounding principle for the intelligibility of other creative asymmetries
(e.g., free will) is defended and maintained dogmatically as a matter of faith rather than
reason.
THE MODERN SYNTHESIS
With the advent of the Renaissance and the newly developed mechanistic view of
nature (as a cosmological expression of the deterministic assumption), the problem of
marrying the strong asymmetrical principle of creative freedom (as  a distinguishing
feature of human being) with our instinct for symmetry becomes acute. By replacing
the  Aristotelian,  organic  view  of  nature  with  a  purely  mechanistic  world  view
(dominated by  a reduction to efficient causes),  the problem of the relation between
creative freedom and nature is exaggerated. The heightened contrast created by the
newly adopted idea of nature as a purely mechanistic framework of material, efficient
relations and the idea of creative freedom tends to present human creative freedom
(e.g.,  freedom  of  the  will)  as  a  radically  unconditioned,  naturally  anomalous (e.g.,
supernatural) capacity/power. It is with the rise of modern philosophy then, and the
5 While  Aristotle’s  theory has  a  certain intuitive appeal  when applied  to organic systems, it  becomes
somewhat strained (at least from our modern, ‘scientific’ perspective) when applied to the inorganic or non-
living world.
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deterministic assumption that underlies its dominant mechanistic view of nature, that
the relation between freedom and nature becomes strained to the point of metaphysical
unintelligibility.
KANT
Kant’s radically subjectivist approach to the newly reformulated modern problem
of freedom and nature marks a significant turn in the speculative effort to formulate
and understand their  relation. His  ‘Copernican revolution’ is an explicit attempt to
develop a systematic account of the intelligibility of nature (thus satisfying the demands
of  both the deterministic  assumption  and the  instinct  for  symmetry)  along with  a
defence of creative freedom. Kant achieves this by reversing the traditional relationship
of  mind  and  nature.  Through  an  analysis  of  the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of
experience in general he concludes that the orderliness of nature (in particular its causal
necessity) is not a character of the natural world in-itself, but the result of constitutive a
priori principles of mind. Rather than view mind as conforming to nature, Kant claims
that it is nature that conforms to the ordering framework, mechanisms and functions of
the rational subject (Kant 1996, 21).  
By reinterpreting the relationship between mind and sensible experience in this
subjectivist manner, Kant is  able to set limits upon the ability of  theoretical reason to
extend knowledge beyond the realm of sensible (i.e., possible) experience. He opens up
a ‘place’ or domain of relevance for practical reason (as the ground of moral action) that is
not subject to the demands of theoretical reason (and so not subject to the constraints of
the  natural,  sensible  world)  (Kant  1996,  27).  Freedom  itself,  as  a  creative,
unconditioned power of self-determination, is said to possess a domain of relevance all its
own that is importantly distinct from nature and so does not undermine nature’s purely
deterministic intelligibility. By approaching the problem in this way, Kant avoids the
difficulties  inherent  in  trying to  incorporate  the  asymmetrical  principle of  freedom
within  the  conditional  framework  of  nature  (viewed  under  the  deterministic
assumption).  He side-steps the problem by relegating each to distinct domains as a
transcendental function of our nature as embodied rational beings.
Because  the  ground  of  creative  freedom  extends  beyond  the  spatio-temporal
conditions  of  sensible  experience  into  a  suprasensible  domain,  creative  freedom
becomes the unconditioned  ground of moral action (making it appear from the point of
view of theoretical reason, as a spontaneity within nature). Viewed as a cause, creative
freedom is thus coincident with a rationally willed action; it is both where and when the
effect  is.  Defined  as  unconditioned,  creative  freedom  ends  up  being  viewed as  a
suprasensible,  unnatural (i.e., supernatural) power of self-determination that lies outside
the sphere of sensible experience and the conditioned, natural world of space and time
(Kant 1996,452).
Kant’s  subjectivist response to the problem of freedom and nature proceeds by
transferring the  problem from a metaphysical  to  an epistemological/transcendental
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plane. He locates the source of the problem within the subjective conditions of human
reason rather than the ontological realm of being per se. As a function of subjectivity,
the problem is  then redefined as a by-product  of  wrongly conflating the otherwise
distinct, heterogeneous activities or domains of theoretical and practical reason (Kant
1987, 14). While the sphere of conditioned relations associated with nature is relegated
to the domain of theoretical reason, the unconditioned power of creative freedom is
relegated to the suprasensible sphere of practical reason and the moral activity of the
human will.
While Kant succeeds in bringing freedom and nature together under the unified
conditions of subjective experience, the unity achieved is tenuous at best. The radical
distinction between speculative and practical reason that results places a great strain
upon the relationship between freedom and nature. For while the possibility of our
freedom may be affirmed as a transcendental necessity for moral action, this very same
creative  freedom  can  never  itself  be  part  of  our  experience (which  is  limited  the
conditional realm of  sensible nature)  (Kant, 1996, 535).  And while it  is  possible to
develop a science of nature within this Kantian framework, the system of nature that
results is virtually devoid of intrinsic value/inherent moral worth.6 The inherent tension
between freedom and nature still exists here, but now it exists within the framework of
the embodied subject rather than the world as such. Kant does not truly resolve the
problem;  he  merely  disguises  it  by  transferring  it  from  an  objective  to  an
epistemological domain.
Kant’s attempt to bring freedom and nature together under the unifying principle
of subjectivity is a brilliant response to the problem as he understands it. But the very
form of his solution as well as many of the difficulties associated with it are a direct
consequence of way the problem itself is formulated (including the initial, deterministic
assumptions upon which it is based). For Kant’s subjectivist solution is a direct response
to the modern, mechanistic (i.e., pre-deterministic) view of nature that he accepts as
true (combined with the Cartesian emphasis upon subjectivity as the primary ground of
knowing).  Kant’s  entire critical  philosophy  is,  in many ways, a  defence of  creative
freedom. But the cosmological scheme against which he works is so heavily grounded in
the deterministic assumption that it leaves no room for creative freedom in nature. His
attempt  to  make  room  for  creative  freedom  by  grounding  it  in  a  suprasensible,
noumenal realm that is also causally efficacious in the sensible world seems to violate
our instinct for symmetry (as relates to the idea of causality in nature) and strain the
limits of philosophical intelligibility. As a direct response it is philosophically brilliant,
but indirectly it has probably done more to exacerbate the problem.
6 Because Kant only extends creative freedom to human agents, he ends up with a world of limited moral
worth,  one that  is,  arguably,  incompatible  with  a  more  comprehensive,  i.e.,  environmental,  ethic.  Since
creative freedom, as the ground of moral worth, is relegated to the suprasensible sphere, it ends up leaving
us with a world completely devoid of intrinsic moral value. And since the only moral good is the good will
(as realized in the exercise of our freedom through a rational accordance with the moral law), then the
highest expression of our humanity ends up having little or nothing to do with our place in the natural
world.
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THE PROBLEM AFTER KANT
The attempt to reorient the problem of freedom and nature by focussing on their
difference,  as  subjective  domains  of  interest,  has  actually  helped  set  in  motion  the
threatened dissolution of systematic, speculative philosophy and the fragmentation into
difference that is so characteristic of philosophy after Kant (e.g., postmodernism). In the
end, the separation of freedom and nature becomes so great that talk about freedom
and talk about nature end up being carried on in radically separate contexts. This has
the rather unfortunate  effect  of  further  dividing freedom from nature,  theory from
praxis,  morality  from  experience,  fracturing  human  experience  into  fragmented,
heterogeneous domains. In the context of a growing enthusiasm for science (and the
theoretical investigation of  phenomenal experience  in general),  it  became easier  to
declare only the purely deterministic realm of nature to be real in any objective sense.
Talk about creative freedom ids labelled as merely subjective, the self-delusory habits of
reason or language or emotion (or some other variant on that theme). And while there
were attempts to resolve this Kantian fragmentation in a systematic way (e.g., Hegel’s
and Schelling’s attempts to incorporate the idea of difference into the identity of the
whole), in the end it is difference that won the day (at least for now) and the systematic,
speculative approach to the problem was largely abandoned. This general failure to
reconcile the relation between freedom and nature, now understood as their radical
difference, thus marked the beginning of the decline of metaphysics and of speculative
philosophy  in  general.  Husserl's  fears  of  the  “inner dissolution”  of  the  ideal  of  a
universal philosophy are in danger of being  finally fulfilled when the very enterprise of
philosophy, as traditionally understood, is itself brought into question (Husserl, 1986,
11f; Rorty, 1983; Lyotard, 1993).
Fortunately, however, this is not the end of the story. For there were some who
resisted  (and  continue to  resist)  the  attack  against  speculative  philosophy  and  the
problem of  freedom and nature (e.g.,  Peirce,  Bergson, Heidegger, etc.).  Prominent
among these is Alfred North Whitehead. His system of speculative philosophy suggests
a novel approach both to speculative philosophy and to the problem of freedom and
nature in particular (though here we primarily concerned with the latter). As I hope to
show (drawing upon Whitehead in particular), the key to resolving the problem lies in
developing a philosophically ‘significant,’ theoretically and morally rich vision of nature
that is grounded in what I am calling the metaphysics of relational creativity.7
WHITEHEAD: CONDITIONING THE UNCONDITIONED
The key to understanding Whitehead’s philosophy is his metaphysical principle of
creativity. By grounding his system upon the principle of creativity, Whitehead is able to
locate  creative  freedom  within the world as a fundamental feature of  the relational
7 For more on the  nature of and need  for philosophical  ‘significance,’  see my forthcoming paper on
“Philosophy as Myth: The Need for ‘Significance’ and the Defence of System.”
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framework of existence in general. This allows us to preserve both the self-determining,
self-constituting promise of creative freedom  and the intelligible sphere of conditional
nature  within a  metaphysical  system that  satisfies  our  instinct  for  symmetry.  In  a
phrase, Whitehead proceeds by conditioning the unconditioned.  
Whitehead defines creativity as the “Category of the Ultimate,” the first and highest
among his metaphysical categories. Creativity is the original or ultimate principle in
terms of which all other principles (e.g., the principles of ‘existence,’ ‘explanation,’ and
‘obligation’)  are  to  be  understood.  While  creativity  is  metaphysically  universal
(functioning as a ‘creative substance’),  it  is  also purely immanent  in that  it  has no
existence apart from its particular instantiations (Whitehead 1978, 31). This means that
the conditions for the possibility of nature are contained entirely within the natural
order,  here  viewed as  a  creative order.  While  creativity  is  nothing apart  from  its
particular instantiations, those particular instantiations give rise to a self-transcending
process of  creative advance, i.e., an asymmetrical press towards the future that is never
reducible to the past. The process of creative advance follows generally from the serial,
self-forming, self-constructing character of the relations that obtain within the pluralistic
field of ‘occasions’ constitutive of existence in general.
Whitehead’s principle of creativity is instantiated as a pluralistic series of ‘actual
entities’  or ‘actual occasions.’ Actual  occasions  are  the  metaphysically fundamental
constituents to which all other modes of being must stand in a derivative, emergent
relation (Whitehead 1978, 21). Actual occasions thus stand as the metaphysical building
blocks of reality. They are defined in functional terms (Bradley 2003). The functioning
of  actual  occasions  within  Whitehead’s  system  is  quite  complex,  including  such
controversial elements as ‘feeling,’ ‘subjective aim,’ the ‘prehension’ of ‘eternal objects,’
etc.  For our  purposes, however,  we can  avoid these  other,  potentially  problematic
notions and focus instead upon what I take to the key element in Whitehead’s theory of
actual occasions, namely, their dual character as entities that: 1) are conditioned by
antecedent  causes  on  the  one  hand,  and  2)  that  also  take  up  or  inherit  those
determining,  antecedent  conditions  through  a  process  of  self-formation  or  self-
construction on the other. Drawing solely upon this dual aspect of Whitehead’s actual
occasions (thereby excluding all references to ‘feeling,’ ‘God,’ ‘eternal objects,’ etc.), we
can pare down Whitehead’s original notion of actual occasions, redefining the ultimate
building blocks of reality as self-integrating structures, or individuals that come into being
through the  serial  advance  of  genetically  inherited  conditions.  These fundamental
building blocks, so defined, form the basis for what I am here calling the metaphysics of
relational creativity.
Expressed  somewhat  simply,  as  a  system  of  relational  creativity,  the  ultimate
building blocks of nature will be a continuous ‘stream’ of creative activity that manifests
itself as a serial process of discrete, self-integrating structures constructing themselves from
genetically  inherited,  determining  conditions  (e.g.,  inherited  ‘material,’  ‘form,’
‘patterns,’  ‘laws,’ etc.). This stream will be comprised of both  self-integrating and  self-
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integrated structures, or individuals (i.e., individuated structures or ‘cells’ that themselves
comprise the stream; some completely integrated, some still in the process of becoming
fully  integrated).  These structures  or  ‘cells’ will  be self-integrating in two senses:  1)
functionally constructing themselves into a unity or whole (i.e., a discrete, individuated,
unified structure or cell), and 2) functionally entering into and becoming part of a larger
whole (e.g., as a member of a complex individual,  organism, ‘society,’ ‘community,’
‘region,’ or nature as a whole).8 Defined as functional members of an iterative series or
cellular stream, once a self-integrating structure becomes fully integrated (in both senses
of that term), another self-integrating structure will immediately follow, repeating the
process and thus continuing the stream. This serial process of self-integration (i.e., the
dual process of self-construction and self-completion) repeats itself indefinitely, giving
rise to a continuous stream of individuated, self-individuating creative activity. These
self-integrating  structures,  while  continuing  the  patterns  they  inherit  (through  the
process of iteration), are also unique individuals. For the novel unity brought into being
through the individuating activity of self-integration is never reducible (exhaustively) to
the antecedent, determining conditions that the individual inherits. 
Within this metaphysical scheme, nature emerges as an immanently creative series
of self-integrating individuals standing in antecedent and successive relations of genetic
inheritance.  It  is  comprised  of  a  plurality  of  self-integrating  and  self-integrated
structures standing in continuous, yet serially distinct relations (like an iterative series).
A self-integrating individual is  thereby  what  it  is  both by  way  of  the conditioned
patterns it inherits and the self-constructing activity that reiterates inherited conditions
as an integrated individual (Whitehead 1947, 102). The same thing can thus be viewed
either  as  an integrated individual or  as  an individuating process of  self-integration
(depending upon one’s perspective).
Metaphysically, the image of nature developed here is entirely self-grounding, for
the  principle of  creativity  to  which  existence  refers  (as  its  explanatory  ground)  is
exhaustively present within the conditional field of nature as such (i.e.,  creativity is
immanent). But even though the system is self-grounding, it is also dynamic and open-
ended rather than static or closed, for the serial nature of the genetic relations also gives
rise to the creative advance of nature. This creative advance manifests itself in two
distinct  ways:  1)  internally,  as  an  individuating process  of  self-integration,  and  2)
externally, as an  efficient causal process whereby  individuated, self-integrating structures
determine  or  condition  the  self-integrating  activity  of  successive  individuals  or
structures (Whitehead 1978, 23). Taken broadly, neither the internal nor the external
process has precedence over the other. Instead, both processes are mutually supporting,
8 As one reviewer of this paper rightly noted, Whitehead’s own account of how self-integrating entities
become part of a larger whole is generally regarded to be problematic (e.g., A.H. Johnson, 1963. Whitehead
and his Philosophy, Lanham: University Press of America, p.53). The main problem involves moving from the
novelty of actual occasions to the novelty of the whole (e.g., a ‘society’). For more on how later process
philosophers have tried to deal with this problem, see Greg J Moses, “Big Things From Little Things? The
Problem  of  the  Compound  Individual.”  Concrescence,  Vol.  4,  2003.
<http://farleighcom.ozstaging.com/ajpt_papers/vol04/04_moses.doc>.
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the one  only being possible  alongside the  other.  Thus  the  internal process of  self-
construction  and  the  external  process  of  efficient  causation  are  defined  here  as
relational notions, i.e., internal self-construction is only possible in relation to external
efficient causation and efficient causation is only possible in relation to internal self-
construction. Both processes stand as distinguishable, yet internally related elements
within the  creative  advance  of  nature.  In  either case,  the  creative  activity  is  itself
continuous,  for  the moment that a self-integrating entity  becomes fully  integrated or
constructed is identical or fully coincident with the beginning of the next self-integrating
individual in the ‘iterative’ series. It is analogous to what Whitehead calls a cell-theory
of existence whereby the end of one ‘cell’ in a series also marks the beginning of the
next.
This process of  creative advance  incorporates an element  of  self-transcendence
within nature,  i.e.,  of  always going beyond the  conditions inherited  from the  past
towards an open-ended, yet determined future. Thus creativity is both immanent and
transcendent insofar as the conditions that constitute nature at any given moment also
contain the conditions for the possibility of novel forms of expression (thereby allowing
for  the  evolution  of  novel  forms).  It  is  in  this  general  sense  that  nature  is  to  be
understood as both deterministically conditioned and immanently creative.
LAW AND THE CONTINUITY OF NATURE
Within this framework, the laws of nature stand as regularly inherited conditions
that extend over large ‘societies’ of self-integrating structures that themselves display a
shared  integral  order  (Whitehead 1978, 90). Causal laws are  defined as persisting
patterns of order arising out of the complex, conditional relations that constitute some
society (or societies) of self-integrating individuals. While every individual in a society
will be shaped by the generalized law that obtains for that society, every such occasion
will also play its role in maintaining and modifying the generalized law that it inherits
(Whitehead 1933, 142f).  
Laws of nature only exist as long as the societies from which they emerge continue
to maintain a minimum cohesiveness of pattern. Once such societies begin to break
down and lose their integral unity, then the laws associated with those societies also
break down (Whitehead 1978, 91). Insofar as the laws of nature stand, however, as real,
emergent features of the self-integrating individuals over which they extend, then such
laws will have an explanatory rather than merely descriptive status (Whitehead 1933,
147f).
As  unique  or  novel  addition  to  their  antecedents,  the  relations  between  self-
integrating  structures  gives  rise  both to  continuity within nature,  as  well  as  difference
(Whitehead 1968, 94f). Depending upon the particular context, each of these aspects is
as important as the other Whitehead 1968, 107).
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THE PROMISE OF FREEDOM
The metaphysics  of  relational  creativity  outlined  here  is  not  panpsychist.  The
creative  character  of  self-individuating  structures  does  not  entail  the  existence  or
presence  of  consciousness or  mind.  Consciousness or  mind  will  have  emerged  or
developed from nature as a contingent fact, just as it is within most naturalistic theories.
The  metaphysical  schema  also  retains  the  important  practical  (and  intuitively
compelling)  distinction  between  living  and  non-living  things.  Thus,  within  the
inanimate world, structural continuity and conformity to law will be the rule. Within
living things, on the other hand, novelty and difference are brought to the fore. For
much of the universe, the rule of law will be the general rule. Only in living things do
we find any strong evidence  of  such purposive  change, a  stronger  emphasis upon
novelty  amidst  conformity,  and  upon  difference  amidst  continuity.  Hence,  while
creativity is present throughout nature as a whole, it is only in living things that we find
the more complex expression of creativity referred to here as creative freedom.
It follows of course that, in the universe at large, there is nothing anomalous about
the development of complex forms of creative freedom. Creative freedom expressed as
the unconditional power of self-determination (as outlined by Kant) is as natural here as
the conditional character of efficient law. The difference between instances of creativity
in the world (as expression of the power of self-integration) will be one of degree rather
than kind (Whitehead 1978, 102). Therefore, creative freedom is never in conflict with
nature as some anomalous affront to the conditioned character or symmetry of nature.
Instead, creative freedom is a reflection of the plasticity inherent within nature as such.
As a genetic process of serial, conditional self-integration, nature is both determining
and self-determining, conditioned and creative.
CONCLUSION
The metaphysics of relational creativity outlined here serves as an ideal starting
point for developing a new (comprehensive, morally,  aesthetically and epistemically
rich) philosophy of nature. Such a system affirms both the intelligibility of nature (and
the promise  of  knowledge) and the reality  of  creative freedom (and the promise of
morality).  It  affirms the conditional  character  of  nature as an intelligible  system of
relations, while at the same time locating the principle of creative freedom within those
natural,  conditional relations.  There are no significant barriers between subject and
object  here,  between  knower and known (Whitehead  1968,  165).  Instead,  all  the
objective  features  of  the world  at large are  capable of  being known and/or made
intelligible (at least in principle), including the very principle of creativity itself (Bradley
1994). In fact, the only form of knowledge that we are denied is what Putnam calls a
God's eye point of view (Putnam 1987, 49f). While the finite is clearly within our grasp,
the infinity of creative advance transcends the finitude of all actualized and actualizing
points of view (Whitehead 1968, 42). Further, since we have no need to neutralize the
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deterministic  effects  of  a  mechanistic,  pre-deterministic  natural  world  upon  the
possibility of our freedom, then we can avoid the radical subjectivist turn taken by
Kant. We no longer need to appeal to a suprasensible, noumenal (e.g., supernatural)
ground as the condition for the possibility of creative freedom, for such freedom is here
grounded in the creativity of nature as such. Finally, because such a framework allows
us to place the principle of self-integration within the natural world as such, nature itself
becomes  a  place  that  is  rich  in  objective  value  (in  stark  contrast  tothevalueless
mechanistic world dominant throughout so much of modern thought).9 
The image of  nature that emerges from the metaphysics  of relational  creativity
outlined here allows us to bring freedom and nature together in a speculative system
that  satisfies  our  instinct  for  symmetry  while  still  maintaining  enough  of  the
deterministic assumption to satisfy most  naturalistic  philosophers. Since  creativity is
nothing  apart  from  its  individual  instances,  and  its  individual  instances  form  a
continuous stream of  serially  situated  structures  of  self-integration,  then the  system
satisfies the demand that “an asymmetry must always come from an asymmetry.” And
since self-integrating structures that stand as the ultimate building blocks of reality must
necessarily stand in a determined relation to antecedent conditions (both in terms of the
‘material’ they inherit as efficient cause as well as the self-integrating ‘power’ that is
continuously  present  throughout  the  iterated  series  of  its  uniquely  individuated
members),  then even the creative  power of  self-integration can itself  be  seen  as  a
constitutive ingredient in the passage of the series. Expressed in Kantian terms, the so-
called ‘unconditioned’ power of self-determination characteristic of creative freedom
(understood as freedom of the will) is here a conditioned activity that is grounded in the
continuous series of self-integrating structures. Thus there is no problem of something
coming from nothing, or of things being perceived as unmoved movers, causa sui,  sui
generis, etc. The ‘unconditioned’ ground for the possibility of creative freedom has itself
been conditioned by the metaphysical principle of relational creativity.
Dr. Philip Rose
Department of Philosophy, University of Windsor
401 Sunset, Windsor, ON
Canada N9B 3P4
prose@uwindsor.ca
9 This is crucial for developing a healthy understanding of nature that is grounded in a truly comprehensive
(i.e., environmental) ethic. Rather than viewing the world as a valueless resource to do with as we please,
we would now have to view it as an essential ground of all that is good, with morally worthy goods being
spread throughout the entire realm of nature as such. Nature thereby emerges as something we must come
to understand and know in all its details, but with the respect due to something that has its own moral
worth to which we are so intimately connected. For more on this see Whitehead (1967, 1968), Merchant
(1983), Rolston (1994), and Lee (1999).
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